DATE:

		200			
ACTION	PK		·ue	NLE	
				• •	

ROUTINE

ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING

2 FEB 68

TROM:

TO:

DIRNSA

SSO DIA (ATTN:

INFO:

CHAIRMAN ICS

JCS (JRC)

DIR-

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF PUEBLO LOSS

MY DIR-21-68 AND DIR-22-68 REFER.

FURTHER NSA ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE OF COMSEC AND SIGINT ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PUEBLO INCIDENT HAS RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING UPDATED REPORT WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO THE POLICY SUB-COMMITTE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON 1 FEBRUARY BY THE DIRECTOR OF NSA.

QUOTE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACTIVITIES ARE CENTERED ABOUT TWO MAJOR PURPOSES: ONE IS TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS, AND SECOND IS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS OF TARGET NATIONS. THE "BILL OF DESTRUCTION" COVERING THE EQUIPMENT OF THE PUEBLO PROVIDED FOR DESTRUCTION OF DIR ADP P2 Α G K M5D32 ADN B1 P04

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

ADNSG

DOCUMENT MARKING SHALL S. CARTER, LTGEN, PAGES DIRECTOR

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-28-

AGO NR.

DOCTO: 4053049

NSA FORM N2288 REV SEP 65

(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65

16 66 used until depleted)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

KEY CARDS AND KEY LISTS, THEN OF THE EQUIPMENT, THEN
CODES AND AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS, AND FINALLY MAINTENANCE AND OPERATING MANUALS. WHILE IT IS THEORETICALLY
POSSIBLE TO HAVE ELECTRONIC AUTOMATIC DETONATION GEAR,
THE PUEBLO WAS NOT SO EQUIPPED. THE HAZARDS OF AUTOMATIC
DETONATION EQUIPMENT ON BOARD A SHIP ARE WEIGHED
AGAINST OTHER METHODS OF DESTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBLE
DAMAGE FROM COMPROMISE, AND ARE GENERALLY CONSIDERED
UNACCEPTABLE.

FOR THE PAST 30 YEARS IT HAS BEEN THE GENERAL U.S.

PRACTICE THAT, WHERE POSSIBLE, SECURITY OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS WILL NOT DEPEND SOLELY ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF THE EQUIPMENT USED TO ENCIPHER AND DECIPHER THE

MESSAGES. DURING THE PAST 20 YEARS NO EQUIPMENT HAS

BEEN PRODUCED WITHOUT VARIABLES WHICH DEPEND UPON

KEYING ELEMENTS, USUALLY KEY LISTS OR KEY CARDS, FOR

THEIR PRIMARY SECURITY. IN PARTICULAR, ALL THE COMMUNICATION SECURITY EQUIPMENTS WHICH THE PUEBLO CARRIED

DEPENDED UPON EITHER KEY LISTS OR KEY CARDS. LOSS OF A

PARTICULAR EQUIPMENT WITH THE KEYING ELEMENT WOULD NOT

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZU	RELEASED AT (ZULU)	
	·		콮	
DOCUMENT MARKING		PAGE	PAGES	
		2 of	. 7	
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	AGI NR.		
AGO		AGO NR.		
Agi		02/20/	02	
ĎТG	TOP SECRET TRINE	DTG 021716	2	
BUSPENSE		1001110		

DEST : 4053049

MSA FORM N2288 REV SEP 65

(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65

to be used until depleted)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

TEOPARDIZE ANY OTHER TRAFFIC ENCIPHERED BY SIMILAR EQUIPMENTS USING DIFFERENT KEYING ELEMENTS. AS SOON AS NOTIFICATION OF THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO WAS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, STEPS WERE TAKEN TO SUPERSEDE ALL KEYING ELEMENTS WHICH SHE CARRIED AND NEW ONES WERE PRESCRIBED.

MACHINE SET-UP FOR A CRYPTO PERIOD WHICH IS NOT LONGER
THAN 24 HOURS. THE KEY CARD IS A CARD PUNCHED WITH A
SPECIFIED PATTERN AND IS INSERTED INTO THE MACHINE BY
MEANS OF A CARD HOLDER. THE KEY CARD AND HOLDER PERMIT
FEELER PINS TO MAKE CONTACT THROUGH RANDOMLY POSITIONED
HOLES AND EFFECTIVELY REWIRE THE CIPHER MACHINES, AGAIN
NOT LESS OFTEN THAN EACH 24 HOURS. THE NUMBER OF
COMBINATIONS RESULTING FROM A CARD SYSTEM IS ASTRONOMICAL
AND A MESSAGE WHICH IS TRANSMITTED THROUGH A MACHINE
USING A PARTICULAR KEYING ELEMENT CAN ONLY BE READ AT THE
OTHER END BY A MACHINE WITH AN IDENTICAL KEYING ELEMENT.

IT IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S JUDGMENT THAT
NO DEGRADATION TO THE SECURITY OF OTHER U.S. COMMUNICATIONS CAN RESULT FROM THIS COMPROMISE EVEN IF THE EQUIPMENT

· 				
DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)		
		≟		
DOCUMENT MARKING		PAGE PAGES		
4		3 of 7		
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	AGI NR.		
ÄĞO				
AGI **		02/20/02		
DTG	TOP SECRET TRINE	DTG		
RUSPENSE		02/7/62		

WERE CAPTURED INTACT.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

AND THE KEY LISTS WERE CAPTURED INTACT, SINCE STEPS WERE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO SUPERSEDE ALL OF THE KEYING MATERIALS. IN THE WORST POSSIBLE CASE, THE FEW MESSAGES TO AND FROM THE PUEBLO COULD BE READ IF ALL MATERIALS AND EQUIPMEN

MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM THE PUEBLO, AS WELL AS FROM THE NORTH KOREANS, INDICATED A DESTRUCTION EFFORT ON BOARD THE VESSEL BY FIRE AS WELL AS JETTISONING. FROM HER COMMUNICATIONS, IT MAY BE INFERRED THAT THE BULK OF HER KEY MATERIAL, PERHAPS ALL, AND AS MUCH EQUIPMENT AS POSSIBLE WAS DESTROYED, BUT THAT SEVERAL PUBLICATIONS WERE PROBABLY COMPROMISED. WE WILL NOT KNOW WHAT UNTIL THE CREW IS RELEASED AND DEBRIEFED.

ON THE INTELLIGENCE SIDE, THE PUEBLO CARRIED A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF COLLECTION GEAR TO ENABLE HER TO MONITOR NORTH KOREAN COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR FACILITIES ON THE EAST COAST THIS EQUIPMENT WAS GENERALLY UNCLASSIFIED (FOUR PIECES CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL) BUT THE USE TO WHICH THE EQUIPMENT

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-19 USC 798

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER RELEASED AT (ZULU) DOCUMENT MARKING REFERS TO MESSAGE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

COULD BE PUT AND THE RESULTS DERIVED THEREFROM ARE CLASSIFIED. IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT IF THE EQUIPMENT WAS UNDA MAGED A REASONABLY PRECISE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PUEBLO'S INTELLIGENCE MISSION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED

IN ADDITION TO THE EQUIPMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE THE PUEBLO CARRIED A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND ANALYTICAL AIDS REQUIRED TO ENABLE HER TO DISCHARGE THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MISSION. ITEMS WERE CAPTURED INTACT, THEY WOULD GIVE THE NORTH KOREANS PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE EXTENT OF U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES, USAGE, AND RADAR EQUIPMENTS. THE PUBLICATIONS ALSO REVEAL A MORE LIMITED U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF THE GENERAL SOVIET COM MUNICATIONS PRACTICES THIS INFORMATION, IF COMPROMISED, WOULD STIMULATE EITHER OF THE TWO NATIONS TO CHANGE THEIR COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICES, SUPERSEDE THEIR CALL SIGN SYSTEMS AND/OR MODIFY THEIR OPERATIONAL CODES.

DISTRIBUTION

(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DRAFTER RELEASING OFFICER

DOCUMENT MARKING

REFERS TO MESSAGE

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

PAGE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO NR.

of 7

NSA FORM N2288 REV SUP 05 Gupersedes N2288 REV AUG 65 (a be used until depleted)

SECRET TR

- 24. Cr.	7 74			
ACT	ION.	PR	FCED	ENCE

to be used until depleted)		CLASSIFICATION	
ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING	
		f. 31	DISTRIBUTION
SECURITY EQUIPM	ENT OR MATERIALS	IN NO WAY WILL	7 () () () () () () () () () (
COMPROMISE II S	COMMINICATION	IS, IT NONETHELESS	1(5) (1)
		o, ii nontintitios	(b) (3) -50 USC 4 (b) (3) -18 USC 5
HAS THIS SERIOUS	ASPECT.	•	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-
	<u> </u>		
***			//
			//
	الله المراقع ا	. B	/_
THE CAPTURE OF I	HE MODERN U.S.	COMMUNICATIONS SE	CURITY
TO ITTO CHAING OF THE		ATD OPEN PROME	
Pier I may or be -		ND OPERATIONS MAN	: I
COULD STIMULATI	ONE OR OTHER OF	THESE COUNTRIES (OR T
TOGGIDLY GOME	ATTOM COTTOTAL MO		
POSSIBLY COMMU	NIST CHINA) TO MA	KE MAJOR CHANGES I	N
THEIR COMMUNIC	ATIONS SECURITY E	QUIPMENT AND PRAC	TICES.
		<u>.:</u> /	2,25
THIS COULD VERY	SERIOUSLY HAMPER	ttu.s.	
signals intellig	ENCE PRODUCTION	ON THESE NATIONS I	N
THE FUTURE.		•	
THERE WE	RE THIRTY (TWENT)	-NINE ENLISTED AND	ONE
Ontar ontal access on	ATTO THE POST OF A STREET	ON DOING STATE	- 1 42 - 2 42
OFFICER) NAVY SE	JURITY PERSONNEL	ON BOARD THE SHIP.	
MOST OF THESE M	EN AND OFFICERS	Were highly skillei) **
The state of the s		HUNTIDITIES OF STATE	- Transition of the state of th
AND REPRESENTED	SEVERAL YEARS OF	EXPERIENCE IN THE	
BUSINESS. SOME	OF THEM HAD INTI	MATE KNOWLEDGE O	Ä
STITES ADDID OF ADSTRA			
	TIVE NAVY COLLECT	TION AND ANALYTIC	
DRAFTER	RELEASI	NG OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DOCUMENT MARKING			PAGE
REFERS TO MESSAGE			6 of 7
E California de	SECURITY	Y CLASSIFICATION	AGI NR.
AGO			AGO NR.
	TOP SEC	CRET TRINE	02/20/02
STATE OF THE PARTY	I OI SEC	MEI IMINE	02 17/6 7

NSA FORM N2288 REV SEP 65 (Superados N2288 REV AUG 65.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

STRIBUTION

02/7/62

EFFORTS AND A FEW OF THEM HAD SOME KNOWLEDGE OF ONE OR TWO SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PROJECTS.

DEPENDING ON THE DURESS TO WHICH THEY MAY BE SUBJECTED AND THE AMOUNT THEY MAY RECALL, SERIOUS COMPROMISE OF SEVERAL HIGHLY CLASSIFIED PROJECTS COULD ENSUE FROM THEIR INVOLUNTARY REVELATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE U.S.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THIS COULD RESULT IN DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE SOVIETS TO DENY THE U.S.

FURTHER INFORMATION.

HOWEVER, NO DAMAGE TO OUR OWN COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY WOULD FOLLOW EVEN FROM THE FORCEFUL EXTRACTION
OF INFORMATION FROM CAPTURED PERSONNEL. UNQUOTE.

X			: (Cuasa		
DRAFTER		RELEASING OFFICE	R	RELEASED AT (2	ULU)
				, ,	2
DOCUMENT MARKING				PAGE	PAGES
	· · · · ·	·		OF	/
REFERS TO MESSAGE		SECURITY CLASSIFI	CATION	AGI NR.	
AGO					
				AGO NR.	/_
AGI				02/20	102
	TOD	CECDET	TDINE	DIG	